Microfinance

Scaling-up Access to Finance for India’s Rural Poor

Shashank Shetty

Welingkar Institute of Management Development and Research

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Synopsis
Despite the depth of the Indian financial system, and the country’s wide network of rural banks, India’s poor households, who are concentrated in rural areas, still have very little access to formal finance. A recent World Bank-NCAER Survey on rural access to finance (the Rural Finance Access Survey-RFAS, 2003) indicates that 70% of the rural poor do not have a bank account and 87% have no access to credit from a formal source. Informal sector lenders remain a strong presence in rural India, delivering finance to the poor: the RFAS, 2003 finds that 48% of landless and marginal farmers borrowed from an informal source at least once in the past 12 months, at rates averaging 48% per year.
But new approaches designed to deliver finance to the poor have emerged in India over the past decade, involving the provision of thrift, credit and other financial services and products of very small amounts, with the aim to raise income levels and improve living standards. Most notable among these microfinance approaches is a nationwide attempt, pioneered by non-governmental organizations, and now supported by the state, to create links between commercial banks, NGOs, and informal local groups (‘self-help groups’, or SHGs). Better known as ‘SHG Bank Linkage’, evidence suggests that the model has effectively targeted poorer segments of the rural population and helped reduce the vulnerability of its clients. The growth of SHG bank Linkage has been truly remarkable, particularly since the late 1990s. In 2003, the number of SHGs linked to banks were close to 800,000, compared to just 33,000 in 1999. SHG Bank Linkage reaches some 12 million women and their households. But outreach is still modest in terms of the proportion of poor households served, covering less than 5% of India’s rural poor.
SHG Bank Linkage seems to have all the right ingredients for scale-up. This paper argues that the success achieved so far by SHG Bank Linkage is attributable to the following key factors, that may also be relevant to other microfinance models in India and elsewhere. First, is the fact that SHG Bank Linkage is well aligned with Indian history and circumstances, and capitalizes on the country’s vast network of rural (formal) bank branches, while building in the convenience and flexibility of informal finance. Second, is the importance of good policy, and skillful and committed leadership. Government established the necessary policy framework for SHG Bank Linkage very early on in the process, introduced a range of measures to encourage banks to lend to SHGs, and assigned NABARD with the task of leading and coordinating SHG Bank Linkage—a task which NABARD has assumed with exemplary diligence. Third, is the need for a conducive legal and regulatory framework; Government implemented a ‘hands-off’ regulatory policy for SHG Bank Linkage. Fourth, is the emphasis on quality; during the early phase of SHG Bank Linkage, a strong emphasis was placed on ensuring that high quality SHGs were promoted and maintained.
Going forward, if the SHG movement is to be scaled-up to offer mass access to finance for the rural poor, NABARD and its partners face several challenges in increasing outreach while maintaining and improving sustainability. At the same time, in an economy as vast and varied as India’s, there is considerable scope for new and diverse approaches to coexist. Improving access to finance for the rural poor will require multiple approaches to meet the diverse financial needs (savings, credit, insurance against unexpected events, etc.) of India’s rural poor through flexible products and services at competitive prices. Government has a critical role to play in creating an enabling and flexible architecture for innovations.
In particular, the paper argues that scaling-up access to finance for India’s rural poor through microfinance will require attention to the following six areas: First, attention to quality. The SHG movement has now reached a scale where NABARD needs to revisit its strategy, with an emphasis on how to ensure that high quality groups are promoted and maintained, with adequate attention to financial sustainability of SHG lending. Quality is also an issue for many independent microfinance institutions (MFIs) in India, which suffer from weak governance and management structures, and the absence of adequate internal controls and financial discipline – issues that must be addressed. Second, an enabling policy, legal and regulatory environment is urgently needed, particularly for the growth of MFIs. Third, clear targeting of clients. The dual pursuit of social ends and financial profits is an ongoing tension for all microfinance; mission drift is a common fear as pressures mount to serve richer clients with larger loans (and thereby to earn higher profits per loan since transactions costs per rupee tend to fall with loan size). Keeping focused on its target population is thus critical to the success of microfinance in India, as elsewhere. Fourth, appropriate products and services, and good staffing policies can contribute significantly to scale-up. Fifth, inclusiveness and competition in the sector can generate high payoffs. Sixth, efforts are needed to overcome geographic concentration.

While microfinance can, at minimum, serve as a quick way to deliver finance in the interim, the paper also argues that the medium term strategy to scale up access to finance for the poor should be to ‘graduate’ microfinance clients to formal finance institutions where they can access standard ‘individual’ loans, possibly on a fully commercial basis. An immediate problem arises in that there are no obvious lenders for microfinance customers to graduate to – none yet are close to offering the reliability, convenience, continuity, and flexibility required by low-income customers. If the idea of graduation is a serious one in India, strong efforts must be made now to reform the rural finance markets and institutions (like the commercial banks and the regional rural banks) with an eye to improving the efficiency of the sector and designing services and products appropriate for small clients. Indeed, India’s vast network of rural banks potentially presents a tremendous advantage, and one on which the country could capitalize in delivering finance for the poor. Over the longer term, therefore, efforts to promote microfinance should go hand-in-hand with efforts to make the formal sector better at “banking the poor”, and government can play a critical role in this context, too.

The paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a brief introduction. Section II reviews the current level and pattern of access to formal finance for India’s rural households, with a focus on the poor. The review highlights inadequacies in rural access to formal finance and the extortionary terms of informal finance, providing a strong need and ample space for innovative microfinance approaches--that combine the safety and reliability of formal finance with the convenience and flexibility of informal finance--to serve the financial needs of India’s rural poor. Section III examines some of the key microfinance innovations in India over the past decade. Section IV takes a closer look at the most dominant among the recent microfinance innovations, SHG Bank Linkage. It evaluates the success with which this approach has been able to reach out to the poor, analyzes the reasons behind this success and lessons learned, and identifies the main issues and concerns in scaling-up the model. Section V concludes by providing some suggestions on what needs to be done to scale-up access to finance for India's rural poor. The paper draws heavily on a recently completed World Bank/NCAER Rural Access to Finance Survey (RFAS-2003) for India.


TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. ACCESS TO FINANCE FOR THE POOR: SOME EVIDENCE 2
2.1 THE CURRENT LEVEL AND PATTERN OF ACCESS TO FORMAL FINANCE 2
2.2 INFORMAL FINANCE 8
III. NEW APPROACHES TO DELIVERING FINANCE TO THE POOR: MICROFINANCE IN INDIA 9
3.1 SHG BANK LINKAGE: LINKING BANKS TO GRASSROOTS BORROWERS 10
3.2 ‘GRAMEEN REPLICATOR- TYPE’ MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 11
IV. EVALUATING SHG BANK LINKAGE 12
4.1 HOW EFFECTIVE HAS SHG BANK LINKAGE BEEN IN TARGETING THE POOR? 13
4.2 IMPACT ON VULNERABILITY OF POOR HOUSEHOLDS 15
4.3 SOME LESSONS FROM SHG BANK LINKAGE 16
4.4 KEY CONCERNS, GOING FORWARD 17
V. MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF SCALING-UP ACCESS TO FINANCE FOR INDIA’S RURAL POOR 18
5.1 SCALING-UP VARIOUS MODELS OF MICROFINANCE: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT POLICY 18
5.2 LONGER-TERM REFORMS IN RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS TO SCALE-UP ACCESS 24
5.3 HOW CAN THE PRIVATE SECTOR HELP IN DELIVERING RURAL FINANCE FOR THE POOR? 26

Scaling-up Access to Finance for India’s Rural Poor
I. Introduction

Since the early national plans, successive governments in independent India have emphasized the link between improving access to finance and reducing poverty, a stance that has had influence globally. The need to improve financial access for India’s poor, the overwhelming majority of whom are concentrated in rural areas, motivated the establishment of a vast network of rural cooperative credit banks in the 1950s, followed by a drive to nationalize commercial banks, launched in 1969. This led to thousands of new bank branches in rural areas across the country. The strategy during the 1970s and 1980s gave the lead role to the nationalized (state-owned) commercial banks, who were charged with loosening the grip of traditional informal sector moneylenders through the use of targeted low-priced loans (Reddy, 1999). The 1990s saw the partial deregulation of interest rates, increased competition in the banking sector, and new microfinance approaches, most notably, a nationwide attempt, pioneered by NGOs and now supported by the state, to create links between commercial banks, NGOs, and informal local groups (‘self-help groups’, or SHGs). Better known as ‘SHG Bank Linkage’, this approach has grown dramatically over the past decade, and while its outreach is still modest in terms of the proportion of poor households served, many believe it is destined to become the country’s dominant system of mass-outreach banking for the poor. However, informal sector lenders remain a strong presence in rural India, delivering finance to the poor, the vast majority of whom still do not have access to either formal or semi-formal (microfinance) sectors. Scaling-up access to finance for India’s rural poor, to meet their diverse financial needs (savings, credit, insurance against unexpected events, etc.) through flexible products at competitive prices, presents a formidable challenge in a country as vast and varied as India. But the opportunities, too, are plentiful, and government has an important role to play in creating space and a flexible architecture for innovations.

This paper begins with a brief review in Section II of the current level and pattern of access to formal finance for India’s rural households, with a focus on the poor. The review draws on a recent World Bank-NCAER Rural Finance Access Survey (RFAS), conducted in 2003. It highlights inadequacies in rural access to formal finance and the extortionary terms of informal finance, providing a strong need and ample space for innovative microfinance approaches--that combine the safety and reliability of formal finance with the convenience and flexibility of informal finance--to serve the financial needs of India’s rural poor. Section III examines some of the key microfinance innovations in India over the past decade. Section IV takes a closer look at the most dominant among the recent microfinance innovations, SHG Bank Linkage. It evaluates the success with which this approach has been able to reach out to the poor, analyzes the reasons behind this success and lessons learned, and identifies the main issues and concerns in scaling-up the model. Section V concludes by providing some suggestions on what needs to be done to scale-up access to finance for India's rural poor. The paper draws heavily on a recently completed World Bank/NCAER Rural Access to Finance Survey (RFAS, 2003) for India.
II. Access to Finance for the Poor: Some Evidence

2.1 The Current Level and Pattern of Access to Formal Finance

India has a deep financial system. Financial assets in India amount to about US$430 billion, in nominal terms, compared to less than $250 billion in Argentina, US$330 billion in Malaysia, or US$386 billion in Mexico, despite India’s significantly lower per capita income. The share of financial assets in GDP in India is about 93%, compared to 81% in Argentina and 68% in Mexico. (Table 1).

Table 1: Depth of Financial Markets – India and Other Emerging Economies (1999/2000) Table 1: Depth of Financial Markets – India and Other Emerging Economies (1999/2000)
Total Financial Assets* (US$m) Equity Market Capitalization / GDP (%) Equities - Value Traded /GDP (%) Domestic Public Bonds on Issue / GDP (%) Domestic Private Bonds on Issue / GDP (%) Total Financial Assets* / GDP (%) GDP per capita 1999 Atlas Method (curr. US$) Private Credit / GDP (%)
Brazil 780,739 39.0 17.0 40.9 8.9 139.7 4,350 50.9
Argentina 231,166 44.0 2.1 11.8 1.0 81.0 7,550 24.2
México 386,366 24.7 7.9 9.2 2.1 68.3 4,440 32.3
India 437,293 34.2 104.7 21.8 0.4 92.8 440 36.4
China 2,153,717 42.5 66.8 19.5 8.5 199.4 780 128.9
Malaysia 331,302 146.5 65.5 29.6 50.0 370.9 3,390 144.8
Korea 1,091,499 64.7 233.1 16.9 45.1 267.0 8,490 140.3
*Simplified definition based on aggregate of assets described in this table.
Sources: World Development Indicators; IFS; IFC - Emerging Markets Database; BIS

Financial depth is attributable in large part to India’s vast network of financial institutions, including those focused on rural customers. The 1970s and 1980s saw a rapid expansion of India’s financial system into rural areas. Following Indira Gandhi’s bank nationalization drive, launched in 1969, commercial banks were required to open rural branches and, between 1973 and 1985, bank branches in rural areas grew at an average of 15.2% each year, about double the growth rate of branches in semi-urban (6.4%), urban (7.8%) and metropolitan (7.5%) areas. Rural branches grew from 1,833 in 1969 to 30,186 in 1985, an increase of 1,547%. By comparison, the increase over the same period for semi-urban, urban and metropolitan areas was only 194, 315 (an increase of 220%). Today, India has over 32,000 rural branches of commercial banks and regional rural banks (RRBs), some 14,000 cooperative bank branches, 98,000 primary agricultural credit societies, not to speak of the thousands of mutual fund sellers, several non-bank finance companies (NBFCs) and a large post office network with 154,000 outlets that are required to focus on deposit mobilization and money transfers.

Not surprisingly, India compares favorably with other developing countries in terms of the distribution of financial services. The average population served per commercial bank branch in India was around 15,000 in 2002, and including the branches of rural cooperative banks, at 12,800, close to levels in Indonesia and Mexico. Also in terms of the average area served per branch, India compares favorably with other countries, indicating a high degree of physical branch presence, which has been improving over time. (Figure 1). India’s performance with respect to insurance penetration is also better than countries like Brazil and China. Measured by insurance premium as a percentage of GDP, insurance penetration in India in 2000 was close to 2.5%, compared to a little over 1% in Indonesia, under 2% in China and Mexico, and a little over 2% in Brazil. General insurance agencies in India are required to source 5% of their gross premium within three years of operations from rural areas (2% in the first year), the actual levels for most companies at present are much lower.

Developments in India’s financial sector, particularly after the late 1960s, resulted in substantial achievements in enhancing access to credit in rural areas. Shortly after independence in 1947, the first survey of rural indebtedness (All India Rural Credit Survey, or AIDIS) prepared by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) documented that moneylenders and other informal lenders met more than 90 percent of rural credit needs. The share of banks in particular was only about 1 percent in total rural household debt. This ratio remained low until 1971 when it was 2.4%, although the share of formal sources of credit in rural areas increased steadily to 29% due to the rising share of cooperatives. Following bank nationalization, the share of banks in rural household debt increased to about 29% in 1981 and 1991 while the share of formal or institutional sources in total debt reached 61.2% before declining in 1991. Correspondingly, the share of moneylenders declined steadily over these four decades.

Table 2: Share of rural household debt by source of credit, All India, 1951-91 (percentages)
Institutional Non-Institutional
Year Banks Cooperatives Government Total Instnl. Relative/Friends Moneylenders Others
1951 1.1 4.6 3.1 8.8 14.4 68.6 8.2
1961 0.3 10.4 6.6 17.3 5.8 60.9 16
1971 2.4 20.1 6.7 29.2 13.8 36.9 20.1
1981 28.6 28.6 4 61.2 9 16.9 12.9
1991 29 18.6 5.7 53.3 6.7 15.7 24.3
“Others” includes non-institutional sources other than friends and relatives and moneylenders, e.g., traders, agriculturist money lender, landlord, etc.
Source: All India Rural Credit Survey and All India Debt and Investment Surveys

Table 3: Summary comparison of AIDIS (1991) and RFAS (2003)
All India UP AP
Formal Formal Formal
Percent of households indebted
AIDIS (1991) 15.6 12.5 16.5
RFAS (2003) 19.4 24.0
Average debt per household
AIDIS (1991) 1221.0 1521.0 1691.6
RFAS (2003) 6376.0 4313.0
Source: RBI (1989), NSSO Report No. 420, RFAS-2003
While no official survey of rural access has been conducted since 1991, the World Bank-NCAER RFAS, 2003 allows for some analysis of trends between 1991 and 2003. Relative to the findings of the AIDIS-1991, the incidence of indebtedness (i.e. proportion of households with debt outstanding to a formal finance institution) had further increased by 2003, indicating greater access and the ability to borrow. Under the assumption that households "prefer” formal borrowing and were earlier rationed due to inadequate supply of such debt, the increase in formal indebtedness could be viewed as an improvement. (Table 3).

According to the RFAS, 2003, some 41% of rural households have a deposit account and 21% of rural households have access to credit from a formal source. Amongst formal institutions, commercial banks are by far the most dominant source of formal finance for rural households. They have the largest share of household deposits among rural banks, and are also the most important source of credit for those rural households who have access to the formal sector. (Figures 2 and 3).

Source: RFAS,2003.

While achievements over the past decades should not be underestimated, poorer households in rural areas in India still have very little access to formal finance. The RFAS, 2003 indicates that rural banks serve primarily the needs of the richer rural borrowers: some 66% of large farmers have a deposit account; 44% have access to credit. Meanwhile, the rural poor face severe difficulties in accessing savings and credit from the formal sector: 70% of marginal/landless farmers do not have a bank account and 87% have no access to credit from a formal source. (Figure 4) Access to formal credit is particularly a problem for meeting unforeseen expenditures – family sources and the local moneylender dominate. Over 970% of households report financing unusual expenses from cash at home, while the second most important source of financing such expenses was reportedly informal loans from family, friends, or monelylenders. Newer sources, such as the recently introduced Kisan Credit Cards, are still statistically insignificant. Access to other financial services, such as insurance, also remains limited for the rural poor, although many would like to have access to insurance. Over 82% of households surveyed in RFAS, 2003, did not have any insurance, and practically none of the poorest households surveyed had insurance.

It should be noted, also, that large regional differences exist in the distribution of financial services, both in terms of the volume of transactions and branch density, with clients in India’s economically weaker regions having a disproportionately lower level of financial access; not surprisingly, poor households in the economically weaker regions are particularly starved of financial access. The spread of branches appears to be closely associated with regional shares in population: the eastern and central regions have larger shares in population and therefore, despite their low share in income, occupy the second and third positions in terms of share in branches. However, the presence of branches alone does not ensure access to finance; as expected, income is a key determinant to financial access. Regional differences in the volume of financial services (volume of credit and deposits) are largely explained by regional income differentials : India’s lesser developed and low-income eastern, central and north-eastern regions account for 54% of the population and 40.5% of total branches, but only 20% of outstanding credit and 29% of deposits. (Table 4).

Table 4. Regional differences in the distribution of financial services
Region Share in all India GDP Share in all India population Regional per capita GDP/national per capita GDP Share in all India credit Share in all India deposits Share in all India bank branches
Northern 18% 13.8% 1.28 21.5% 22.9% 16.1%
North-Eastern 3% 3.7% 0.76 1.5% 1.6% 2.5%
Eastern 14% 23.6% 0.58 9.2% 12.9% 17.7%
Central 17% 26.6% 0.64 8.9% 13.6% 20.3%
Western 22% 15.5% 1.39 32.2% 26.4% 15.6%
Southern 28% 16.9% 1.63 26.6% 22.6% 27.4%
Total 100% 100% 1.00 100% 100% 100%
Source: RBI, Basic Statistical Returns, 2002; RBI, Handbook of Statistics, 2003; Census 2001

2.1.1 What explains the lack of access to formal finance by the rural poor?
The failure of India’s rural banks to deliver finance to the poor may be attributed to a combination of factors affecting both banks and their clients. From the perspective of the rural banks, serving the rural poor is a high-risk, high-cost proposition. First, is the problem of uncertainty. As in many other countries, uncertainty about the repayment capacity of poor rural borrowers, and their irregular/volatile income streams and expenditure patterns (Box 1), in the absence of credit information, serve to drive up default risk. Problems of uncertainty are exacerbated by the borrower’s inability to provide collateral, and/or difficulties in contract design and enforcement and in repossession of collateral. Also, the rural poor are perceived as “bad clients” because they typically want to borrow for consumption smoothening rather than investment purposes, and if they do borrow for investment, they lack information on how to make their business viable.

Second, the transactions costs of rural lending in India are high, mainly due to the small loan size, high frequency of transactions in rural finance, large geographical spread and heterogeneity of borrowers, and widespread illiteracy. For private sector banks – their lack of a rural branch network is an additional problem.

Third, the Indian Government’s policies make things worse from the banks’ perspective, creating a “financial climate” that is not conducive to lending in general, and rural banking in particular:

• High fiscal deficits have meant that Government is appropriating a large share of financial savings for itself. The overall public sector fiscal deficit has risen from 8.3% of GDP in 1995-96 to around 11-12% of GDP. Not only does this preempt credit to the private sector, but also, it provides banks with plenty of opportunities to deploy resources in relatively safer assets (Government securities). Also, statutory preemptions (Statutory Liquidity Ratio and Cash Reserve Ratio) imposed on banks, albeit on a gradually declining path, remain high by international standards, further crowding out credit to the private sector. Banks are required to direct 40% of their lending to “priority sector” (including agriculture and other rural borrowers), but most banks get around this requirement by subscribing to other eligible instruments, for example, investing in bonds issued by apex banks such as NABARD and SIDBI.

• Persisting interest rate restrictions reduce the attractiveness of lending, particularly to small, rural clients. Banks’ borrowing costs are kept high by “floors” on short-term deposit rates, while Government policy dictates that lending rates on small loans in the rural sector be “capped” at the prime lending rate (PLR), which banks are free to set. These restrictions impose an “implicit tax” on banks: The loss in the income of rural banks from lower lending rates is estimated at $550 million to $1.1 billion; this implies that the net profit of the banking sector is 30% lower than what it could have been.

• Government’s domination of/ interference in rural banks, particularly the RRBs and cooperative banks, further distorts bankers’ incentives. The inefficiencies arising from weak governance and poor management have also meant that many of these banks are in deep financial distress, and no longer in a position to perform their task of financial intermediation. (Figure 5).

• Bankers’ risk aversion to lending is exacerbated by a pervasive culture of suspicion towards bankers, whose lending decisions are often subject to stringent scrutiny by parliament, the Central Bureau of Investigation, etc.

An outcome of these realities has been in a dilution of the credit creating role of banks – resulting from the distortion of risk and return signals that encourage banks to divert their liabilities into relatively safer and more attractive Government securities than lending to poor rural clients who are perceived as being high risk. Outstanding assets of commercial banks in Government securities, at end-September, were much higher (at around 45%) than the mandated SLR (25%). As capital adequacy norms are being tightened, further shifts are likely to take place in the deployment of deposits to Government securities and other investments that carry a relatively lower risk weighting than loans.

From the perspective of small, rural borrowers (the users), rural banks are unattractive for the following reasons. First, rural banks do not provide flexible products and services to meet the income and expenditure patterns of small rural borrowers. As noted above, small rural borrowers have irregular/volatile income streams and expenditure needs, and therefore, prefer to borrow frequently, and repay in small installments, but most banks do not offer such products. Also, while small rural borrowers seek savings and lending products, they also seek insurance (life, health, crop), which banks do not generally offer.

Second, the transactions costs of dealing with formal banks are high. In part, high transactions costs stem from distance to the nearest financial institutions. According to the RFAS, 2003, the median distance to the nearest financial institution ranges from 2 kms (post office branches) to 5 kms (commercial banks, cooperative banks); the median time taken to travel to the nearest commercial bank, cooperative or RRB is 30 minutes (post offices are available at closer proximity). Furthermore, procedures for opening an account or seeking a loan are cumbersome and costly (with high rejection rates) and, as indicated by the RFAS-2003, clients have to pay hefty bribes (ranging from 10%-20% of the loan amount) to access loans, so that the ultimate cost to borrowers is very high (despite interest “caps”). On average, some 27%48% (and 48% in UP) of sample households who borrowed from an RRB report having to pay a bribe to get the loan, a little under 27%40% of households who borrowed from a commercial banks paid a bribe, and 109% of households who borrowed from a credit cooperative paid a bribe. The bribe amounts appear to vary from anywhere between 10% of the loan amount (in the case of banks) to 2024% (in the case of cooperativesRRBs).Moreover, longer processing times for loans, together with bribes, could result in higher effective costs to borrowers and consequent credit rationing. It takes, on average, 336.5 weeks for a loan to be approved by a commercial bank. (Table 5).

Source: RFAS-2003.

A third factor that makes formal banks unattractive for rural borrowers is that banks demand collateral, which poor rural borrowers lack. Indeed, the majority of loans extended by commercial banks, RRBs and cooperatives are collateralized, with 89% of households who borrowed from RRBs, and 87% of households who borrowed from commercial banks, reporting that they had to provide collateral (RFAS-2003). Land remains by far the most predominant form of collateral. But, this collateral is seldom executed, so it is just another cost, with little benefit in practice.

2.2 Informal Finance

The reliance on informal finance is heavy. Around 44% of the households surveyed by RFAS,2003 report having borrowed informally at least once in the preceding 12 months; the interest charged on informal loans averages 48% per annum. Not surprisingly, informal borrowing is very important for the poorest (marginal and commercial categories), who are the most deprived of formal finance, though it is important for virtually all household categories. (Table 6).

The main source of informal borrowing is moneylenders (some 56% of households who report having borrowed informally in the past 12 months used moneylenders), followed by friends/relatives (21%). The largest uses of informal loans are for meeting “family emergencies”(29%) and “social expenditures” (19%) arising from events such as births, marriages, deaths. Some 13% of borrowers report using informal loans for investment-related purposes.
Informal loans tend to be of a short tenor. Close to 50% of the households who report having borrowed informally in the preceding 12 months took loans with a tenor of less than (or up to) six months. Other significant features that make informal loans more attractive to the poor include flexible repayment, the convenience and frequency with which such loans can be accessed, and less reliance on collateral (only 16.5% of households report providing collateral against the loan). But among those who report providing collateral for informal loans, the overwhelming collateral cited is “self labor” – evidence of interlinked credit contracts spanning credit and labor, or bonded labor. Almost all cases reporting self labor as collateral are landless/marginal farmers, who are too poor to offer any assets as collateral, and hence most vulnerable to harsh contracts linking their labor to loans.

III. New Approaches to Delivering Finance to the Poor: Microfinance in India

Inadequacies in rural access to formal finance and the seemingly extortionary terms of informal finance for the poor provide a strong need and ample space for innovative approaches to serve the financial needs of India’s rural poor. Over the last decade, efforts have been made by government, financial institutions, and NGOs, often in partnership, to develop new financial delivery approaches. These microfinance approaches have been designed to combine the safety and reliability of formal finance with the convenience and flexibility that are typically associated with informal finance. They typically involve providing thrift, credit and other financial services and products of very small amounts to the poor, with the aim to raise income levels and improve living standards.

But microfinance still plays a modest role in India. At the All-India level, less than 5% of poor rural households have access to microfinance (as compared to 65% in Bangladesh) but significant variations exist across states. The southern states in particular, account for almost 75% of funds flowing under microfinance programs. By far the most successful model of microfinance in India, in terms of scale and outreach, is SHG Bank Linkage, with other models, such as the ‘Grameen-type’ independent microfinance institutions, lagging far behind.
3.1 SHG Bank Linkage: Linking Banks to Grassroots Borrowers

There has been growing excitement about SHG Bank Linkage, and many believe it is destined to become the country’s dominant system of mass-outreach banking for the poor. The SHG model was started in the 1980s by social-development NGOs , many of whom took up group-formation (especially of women) as their main tool. Having group members learn how to pool savings into loans – mostly small, short-term consumption loans – was seen as empowering disadvantaged women, socially and politically as well as financially. By 1992 the NGOs had, heroically, persuaded government to take the idea seriously. Legal obstacles were removed and subsidies made available so that SHGs could take bulk loans from banks that could be on-lent to group members who could use them to take up or expand microbusinesses.

The model evolved so that SHG Bank Linkage today involves having the group save, and then linking it to a bank (usually the rural branch of a state-owned commercial bank, but also RRBs, cooperative banks, etc Funds saved by SHGs are placed in a group deposit account in the bank. The group then borrows from the bank (at about 12% per annum), using its saving and group guarantee as the collateral. To encourage banks to lend to SHGs, NABARD has provided subsidized refinancing support to banks, although the demand for such refinancing has declines as banks begin to discover that SHG lending is quite profitable, and characterized by default rates (less than 1%) that are, in fact, much lower than the rate of default on their regular lending portfolios (11%-12%).

Banks typically provide the group a loan amounting to four times the group’s savings but, as the group matures, and based on the group’s track record, banks are ready to lend more. Borrowed and saved funds are rotated through lending within the group using flexible repayment schedules (usually monthly repayment); SHGs thus save, borrow and repay collectively. SHG funds may be distributed either to one or more members of the group – who are personally responsible for repayment to the group, or spent collectively by the group. The group is free to decide the interest rate charged to its members, but typically, a member borrows from the group at about 24% per annum. After a loan from a bank is fully repaid, the group may borrow again, often a larger amount.

3.1.1 The Phenomenal Growth of SHG Bank Linkage: From a small experiment to a ‘movement’
Growth in the numbers of SHGs formed, and the scale of their interaction with banks, has been very fast in the last three or four years, and is still accelerating. What started as a pilot has now become a ‘movement’. The number of SHGs linked to banks has increased from just 500 in the early 1990s, to over 800,000 by 2004. NABARD hopes to see a million SHGs serving 20 million households by 2008. The rapid rate at which the model has scaled-up, particularly since the late 1990s, is truly remarkable. Between 1999 and 2003, the number of SHGs linked to banks increased cumulatively from 32,995 to 717,306. This is an increase of more than 2000%, a staggering achievement in a short period of four years. During the same period, the amount of loans disbursed cumulatively increased by 3,487%. But with an outreach of about 12 million women and their households (in a country where 460 million people live on less than $/day), SHG Bank Linkage has a long way to go before it can really make a dent. (Table 7).

Table 7. Growth in SHG-Bank Linkage
By Mar 31 Number of SHGs linked to banks, cumulative nos. Cumulative bank loans (Rs. Million)
1999 32,995 571
2000 114,775 1,930
2001 263,825 4,809
2002 461,478 10,263
2003 717,306 20,487
Source: World Bank (2003).

3.2 ‘Grameen Replicator- type’ Microfinance Institutions

Recent years have witnessed the emergence of other institutional structures for microfinance, notably, independent, specialized microfinance institutions (MFIs) that are based on the Grameen model pioneered by Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh. But with a few exceptions, most Indian MFIs are small in size, region specific (with a concentration in the south) and the sector has a limited collective outreach. The Small Industries Development Bank of India has been the largest lender to the MFIs, though Friends of Women’s World Banking India as well as the National Women’s Fund (Rashtriya Mahila Kosh) have also played an important role.

In March 2003, the Indian MFIs sector as a whole had a total outreach of less than one million borrowers. In comparison, larger MFIs in Bangladesh, such as Grameen Bank, BRAC, Proshika and ASA, reach well over one million clients, each. In March 2003, the Indian MFIs sector as a whole had loans outstanding of Rs 2.4 billion (US$53 million), with the two largest MFIs, SHARE Microfin Ltd and BASIX, having loans outstanding of about Rs 500 million (US$11 million)and Rs 350 million (US$8 million), respectively. One estimate indicates that the average loans disbursed by the top 10 MFIs in India amounted to just Rs 160 million (US$3.5 million) per MFI. Another estimate, based on 69 rated MFIs (which are among India’s top 100 MFIs), shows that these MFIs had about 6500 borrowers and Rs 23 million (a little over US$500,000) outstanding, per MFI. (Sinha, 2003). This numbers are modest in comparison to lending by MFIs in Bangladesh: Grameen Bank’s loan portfolio alone exceeds that of the entire microfinance sector in India by a factor of five whereas BRAC’s portfolio is more than three times that of all MFIs in India; both ASA’s and Proshika’s portfolio is also greater than that of the entire microfinance sector in India.
In addition to the relatively small scale of their operations, Indian MFIs also tend to have a narrow scope, offering a limited range of financial services beyond credit. Only a handful of MFIs, such as VSSU (West Bengal) offer savings as a service. Insurance is also provided by only a few MFIs. And only the three top MFIs in India offer a composite set of services to their customers. For example, SEWA Ahmedabad provides a combination of savings and credit through its Sri Mahila SEWA Urban Cooperative Bank and insurance services managed through its Vimo SEWA affiliate, which front ends for the LIC and a number of general insurance companies. Similarly, the BASIX group’s Krishna Bhima Samruddhi Local Area Bank, is able to provide all the services – savings, including daily deposits collected from the doorstep of its borrowers, credit for a range of purposes from crop loans to non-farm activities and to SHGs; and crop insurance to farmers under the Kisan Credit Card / Rashtriya Krishi Bima Yojana as well as a weather indexed crop product developed by ICICI Lombard. BASIX retails life insurance on behalf of AVIVA Life Insurance Company and provides livestock insurance to its borrowers through Royal Sundaram General Insurance Company.
SHARE, one of the three largest MFIs in India, has recently piloted, in partnership with ICICI Bank,, a private sector banks, an innovative approach involving the securitization of the micro loan portfolios of MFIs. Two such deals have recently been completed in the state of AP. In the larger one, ICICI Bank paid $4.3 million for a portfolio of 42,500 small loans from SHARE. SHARE will be responsible for collecting the loans. The securitization is not asset-backed; ICICI Bank will have as collateral instead a “first loss’ guarantee of an 8% deposit from the total from Grameen Foundation. The approach has many advantages: ICICI Bank manages to reach borrowers it could never otherwise have approached, and palm off most of the administration to SHARE. This also helps it meet its government-set target of directing 40% of its loans to the “priority sectors”, including 18% to farmers. SHARE secures a new source of funds, off SHARE’s balance sheet, at a cost that is 3 to 4 percentage points cheaper than it pays for a bank loan. This will help SHARE meet its aim of increasing the number of borrowers from under 300,000 now to 1 million. The deal also helps create a new asset class for which there is demand among the more liquid investors. While such securitizations can be done for the better MFIs, for which credit ratings are available, replication would pose a serious challenge, given the paucity of reliable, independent information on the bulk of the MFIs and their loan portfolios. Also, at present, there is no secondary market for the securities, but ICICI bank is talking to CRISIL, a credit rating agency, about the prospects for its rating the paper, and is hoping that over time, other banks will enter the market too.

The limited scale and scope of Indian MFIs, relative to the MFI giants in Indonesia and Bangladesh, reflects, at least in part, the absence of an enabling policy, legal and regulatory framework. First, MFIs are not allowed to mobilize deposits (even from their own members) unless they convert themselves into a non-bank finance company ( NBFC). And even as NBFCs, an ‘investment grade’ rating from corporate rating agencies is required for mobilizing deposits. This is difficult for most MFI-NBFCs; based on past examples, on account of the typically geographically concentrated and non-collateralized portfolios that MFIs have, rating agencies, in almost all cases, have not assigned the required credit rating. Second, the minimum start-up capital requirement for registering as an NBFC (Rs. 20,000 or US$450,000) is typically beyond the reach of most MFIs. Similarly, the minimum capital requirements for insurance companies (Rs 1 billion, or US$23 million) are high. What’s more, since 2002, MFIs are no longer allowed to raise debt from foreign donors and development finance institutions through the ‘External Commercial Borrowing’ (ECB) route. MFIs also have problems raising equity: NGOs are not allowed to invest in MFI equity, because of the charitable status of NGOs under the Section 11 and 12 of the Income Tax Act. And regulation on equity investment in MFIs dictate that foreign equity must be a minimum of YS$500,000, and cannot excced 51% of total equity; this implies that bringing in US $500,000 foreign equity requires raising an equal amount (almost Rs 23 million) from India – an amount that is considered far too high by most Indian MFIs.
IV. Evaluating SHG Bank Linkage

4.1 How Effective Has SHG Bank Linkage Been in Targeting the Poor?

Although data available to us cannot answer this question directly, we can look at some indirect indicators on the relationship between SHGs and the poor using results of the RFAS, 2003 for the states of AP and UP.
First, the majority of the beneficiaries of SHG Bank Linkage are from among the poorer groups. RFAS, 2003 indicates that nearly 54% of SHG members are from the poorest groups—the landless and marginal farmers. However, significant differences exist across states. While 73 percent of SHG members in UP are from the poorest households – the landless and marginal farmers, the corresponding proportion in AP is lower (43 percent). In AP, though, almost a quarter of the poorest households belong to SHGs, but the proportion of households from richer categories that belong to SHGs is much higher. (Table 8).

Table 8. SHG membership by type of households
Marginal Small Medium Large Others Total
Andhra Pradesh
SHG member (% households) 25.3 34.3 31.1 29 29.6 28.2
% of SHG members 43.3 14 11.4 11.4 19.9 100
Uttar Pradesh
SHG member (% households) 10.3 5.4 5.3 4.1 6.7 8.2
% of SHG members 72.8 8.8 7.4 4.4 6.7 100
Marginal = landholding less than 1 acre, Small = 1-2 acres, Medium = 2-4 acres, Large = more than 4 acres. Others includes households with or without land but involved in commercial activities.
Source: RFAS-2003

We can explore further the success with which SHGs are targeting the poorest by examining the attributes of households that are SHG members, using data from AP. We model this in a ‘probit’ framework using as explanatory variables household’s relative income rank in terms of income quintiles (“poorest” are the bottom quintile, qint2 the next and so on) and the number of SHGs available in the village (shgnum). Other explanatory variables available in the survey include the number of other households in the village that are related to the household (relatvs), since this could indicate the household’s access to informal finance. We also include as explanatory variable whether or not it has an account with a formal financial institution (bankac), as a crude indicator for access to the household of formal finance. Finally, we also include a regional dummy for villages in coastal districts (coastal)

Table 9. Probit estimates of likelihood of a household being a member of an SHG
dF/dx s.e. Z
Shgnum 0.002 0.001 2.27
Coastal -0.045 0.017 -2.58
Poorest 0.039 0.030 1.32
Quint2 0.072 0.028 2.67
Quint3 0.102 0.034 3.13
Quint4 0.039 0.028 1.41
Bankac -0.042 0.019 -2.23
relatvs -0.007 0.002 -3.46
N= 2910 PseudoR2= 0.011
The estimated coefficients are reported in terms of the incremental impact on the probability of the household being an SHG member due to a small change in the explanatory variable. Thus, an increase in the number of SHGs in the village by 1 increases the probability of a household being in an SHG by 0.2 percent. Similarly, households in the second quintile have a 7.8 percent higher likelihood of being in SHGs compared to households in the richest quintile. Although the overall fit of the regression is low, suggesting other variables (not available in the survey data) are also important, the coefficients of all variables included are statistically significant at 5% level of significance, except the poorest and quint4. The three variables with statistically insignificant coefficients are poorest, quint4 and expnd. This suggests that households in the two quintiles above the poorest households are more likely to be SHG members, while the poorest and those in the top two income quintiles are less likely to be in SHGs. Note though that the coefficient for poorest quintile is positive even if insignificant, and that the second quintile may still include households that are quite poor, even if not among the poorest. (Table 9).

We can also use the RFAS-2003 data to answer a related question using villages and SHGs in AP, where SHGs were found in all villages: Are poorer villages more likely to have a larger number of SHGs? What explains inter-village variations in SHGs? One approach is to use the standard Poisson model for count data to analyze the number of SHGs in a given village. Specifically, let yi denote the number of SHGs in village i and let yi be distributed as a Poisson with mean i where

i = exp (Xi )

and Xi is a vector of explanatory variables. However, a preliminary look at the data shows an overdispersion in number of SHGs relative to the Poisson, with the variance substantially higher than the mean. To account for the overdispersion, we use a negative binomial distribution that can be viewed as modifying the equation above to

i = exp (Xi  + u i)

where u i denotes some omitted variable(s) such that eui follows a Gamma distribution with mean 1 and variance . Larger values of  imply greater dispersion in the data.

Table 10. Negative Binomial Regression Estimates for SHGs in a village, AP
Coef. z P>z
Constant 5.96 3.98 0
Size 0.002 6.15 0
Illiterate -0.04 -2.25 0.024
Primary -0.07 -3.88 0
Avpcy 0.00 0.07 0.943
Giniland -1.47 -0.94 0.348
Ngo -0.33 -1.60 0.11
Rail 0.01 1.43 0.154
Road -0.06 -1.95 0.052
RRB -0.03 -2.01 0.045
Coop 0.02 2.29 0.022
Alpha 0.22 0.06 3.49
N 59 Pseudo R2 0.12
Likelihood ratio test of alpha=0: chi2(1) = 50.19 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000. Robust estimates used for standard errors.
Results of the negative binomial regression are provided below using a number of explanatory variables related to poverty in the village – village average per capita income (avpcy), inequality in land holdings (giniland), and connectivity of the village measured by distance to nearest railway station and nearest metal road (rail & road respectively). Poorer villages will have lower per capita incomes, while greater inequality for any given per capita income would indicate more poor people in the village. Villages farther away from access to rail and road, and hence markets, may be relatively poorer. The percentage of illiterate households in the village is also likely to be correlated with village poverty and is included. In addition, we also include an index of educational attainment for villagers who are not illiterate in the form of percentage having primary education. Other variables included are total village size in terms of number of households (size) and whether or not NGOs are active in the village (NGO). Finally, since rural institutions like RRBs and cooperatives can also assist with SHG formation, we also included their distance from the village (RRB and coop respectively). (Table 10).

The results suggest absence of a strong relationship between village-level indicators of poverty and the number of SHGs. The size of the village is significant indicating the larger the village, greater the number of SHGs found. Higher rates of illiteracy, presumed correlated to poorer villages, are associated with fewer SHGs in the village. Similarly, the negative sign for (distance to) metal road implies villages in the interior, away from good roads, have fewer SHGs. Noticeably, neither village per capita income nor inequality within the village is significant, again underlining the weak link between poverty and presence of SHGs. The coefficient for NGOs is negative but insignificant, implying no significant relationship between presence of NGOs and number of SHGs in the village.

To summarize, therefore, the RFAS-2003 data allow for the first time a statistical analysis of certain aspects of SHGs in India, which we have used to look at the reach of the SHG-bank linkage model into the poorest households, who are predominantly amongst those excluded from formal finance. Our results show a positive relationship between poorer households (income quintiles from 20-40 and 40-60) and SHG membership. The relationship between the poorest households and SHG membership is positive too, though not significant statistically. On the other hand, despite the proliferation of SHGs across the state in AP, the data suggest that the poorer and more difficult to reach villages are likely to have relatively fewer SHGs. This only further underlines the challenges ahead in scaling-up microfinance for a vast and varied country like India.

4.2 Impact on Vulnerability of Poor Households

Recent analyses indicate that access to loans under SHG bank Linkage has contributed to the reduction in vulnerability of poor households. This reduction in vulnerability takes the form of: (1) Improvement in asset position: the program significantly improved the asset position (comprising livestock and consumer durables) of sample households. The average increase in assets was about 72 percent, from Rs 6,843 to Rs 11,793 in real terms (in one to three years). About 59 percent of households saw assets increase after groups were formed. Before the groups were formed, one in three households had no assets; after the groups were formed that changed to one in six; (2) Increase in savings: the average savings per member more than tripled, from Rs 460 before the group to Rs 1,444 after; (3) Changes in borrowing patterns and activities financed: average borrowing per household increased from Rs 4,282 to Rs 8,341. A shift was observed in the activities of the self-help groups, with a lower share of consumption and cultivation loans after the groups formed and a larger share of allied agricultural activities and small businesses; (4) Increase in employment: employment per household went from an average of 318 days a year to 375 days. The proportion of employment generated through nonfarm and off-farm activities increased; (5) Increase in consumption expenditure: consumption expenditure per household per month increased from Rs 799 to Rs 993. Per capita consumption increased from Rs 197 per month to Rs 249; (6) Impact on income: the average net income per household increased from Rs 20,177 to Rs 26,889. About 43 percent of the incremental income generated was from nonfarm activities; (7) Impact on poverty: about 234 households were below the poverty line before groups were formed, compared with 122 after; (8) Social impact: 89 percent of members reported that, as a result of the group’s activities, they could meet officials from the government or from banks, while about 77 percent had never had that opportunity before. Changes were also reported regarding attitudes toward women.

Further work should be conducted on the performance of the program from the point of view of the financial institutions that provide the linkage. This would provide lessons on the costs and benefits associated with the self-help group model, including which entity in the linkage covers what costs, what financial benefits banks get from the self-help group program, potential adjustments and innovations banks have made to the self-help group model, and incentives that motivate them to be involved in the program and in microfinance in general. It will be particularly important to analyze private banks to draw on their experiences and assess their potential to play a larger role in microfinance in India.
4.3 Some Lessons from SHG Bank Linkage

In large part, the success of SHG Bank Linkage may be attributable to the fact that it is well aligned with Indian history and circumstances, and capitalizes on the country’s vast network of rural bank branches. The idea of local savings-and-loan clubs enjoying access to formal financial services by becoming corporate customers of banks is a good one and is practiced in a small way in many countries. A well-run club can keep its reserves at the bank and take bulk loans which it can on-lend to its members at a premium, covering its costs and rewarding its savers in the process. In India, this practice seems particularly appropriate on two counts: First, the country has active NGOs that have been zealous in their efforts towards group formation; NGOs view SHGs as having many benefits (such as women’s empowerment) beyond microfinance. Second, and perhaps even more important, SHG Bank Linkage seems particularly suited to India because the model capitalizes on the country’s vast (and unique) network of rural banks that are otherwise unable to reach out to the poor.

Equally important, the success of SHG Bank Linkage underscores just how important a role skillful leadership, good policy, and a conducive legal and regulatory framework can play. Indeed, the role of government in establishing the necessary policy and legal framework, and the leadership role assumed by NABARD in championing the movement, cannot be underestimated. Government recognized the potential of SHG banking very early on in the movement’s history; NABARD was given the task of leading this effort and it took to task with exemplary diligence. It involved NGOs, commercial banks, RRBs and even cooperative banks in forming SHGs and then linking those up with nearby bank branches. Legal obstacles were removed and the RBI issued Guidelines in 1992, to experiment with a pilot of 500 SHGs to link with banks. This pilot program as well the work of a number of NGOs was reviewed by a Working Group on Bank Lending to the Poor through NGOs and SHGs (1995) and detailed guidelines were drawn to encourage banks to use this method.

To encourage banks to lend to SHGs, NABARD made available subsidized refinancing to banks for their lending to SHGs, so that the groups could take bulk loans from banks that could be on-lent to group members who could use them to take up or expand microbusinesses. (More recently, such subsidized refinancing to banks has been phased out, as banks have begun to see SHG lending as a profitable and commercially viable business). Further inducements for banks came in the form of allowing banks to count SHG lending towards their legal obligation to direct a fraction of their loans to the poor (‘priority sector lending’ obligations). It seemed an ideal way to realize an old Indian dream – to make the vast network of rural banks key suppliers of loans to the poor.

4.4 Key Concerns, Going Forward

4.4.1 Outreach
The outreach of SHG Bank Linkage, however, remains limited, reaching only about 12 million women and their households (in a country where 460 million people live on less than $/day). The outstandings of the SHG program in March 2003 were around Rs 10 billion ($ 217 million), thus catering to 2.2% to 6.6% of the estimated demand. (Mahajan and Ramola, 2003). And loan amounts remain small. In 2003, SHG member households got an average of Rs 1,766 as credit, after being in a group and meeting monthly for anywhere between 9 to 24 months. In 2002-03 only 22% of SHGs existing at the beginning of the year, received loans during the course of the year – even assuming a two year loan period, this means that more than half of the existing SHGs did not receive a loan during the year. In addition, the program remains concentrated in the southern states of India: the Southern region accounts for 65% of the SHGs linked and over 75% of the amount disbursed. In contrast, the North- eastern region accounts for 0.6% of the SHGs and 0.3% of the amount. Even the densely populated and highly poor Eastern region accounts for 12.6% of the SHGs linked and 5.9 % of the amount.

4.4.2 Sustainability
Even its most enthusiastic supporters have voiced concerns about the sustainability of SHG Bank Linkage. An important concern relates to the lack of clarity over who is to play the key role of promoting and maintaining groups to ensure quality, and how the costs of doing so are to be met. In the early phase of the SHG movement, the tasks of promoting, nurturing and strengthening groups , were performed by grass roots NGOs. However, in NABARD’s zeal to link a cumulative total of one million SHGs to banks by 2008, and as SHG Bank Linkage has caught the attention of politicians who view the program as an easy vote winner, quantitative targets on the number of groups to be promoted each year are overriding concerns about the quality of the groups promoted. Many of the recent groups have been promoted by institutions that either lack the required skills and local knowledge or ones that are driven by short term monetary incentives. Many groups have come together on an ad hoc basis, only because they want a loan. Inadequate attention to group quality could threaten the longer term credibility and viability of the entire program. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that the quality of groups is already beginning to suffer. A recent APMAS Survey in 2002 indicated that only 17 percent of all groups were of adequate quality for bank linkage and this was in a state which is considered the leader in the movement.

Concerns have also been expressed about the financial sustainability of SHG Bank Linkage. The state-owned commercial banks and RRBs, which are the main players in SHG banking, have been increasing their lending to SHGs dramatically, but this has been done without much attention to the actual costs of doing business with SHGs. Banks have been lending to SHGs at interest rates of between 12% and 12.5%. Recently, two state-owned banks, the State Bank of India and Andhra Bank, have announced their intention to lend at 9% per annum, viewing SHG lending as a highly profitable business. Recent studies, however, indicate that the all inclusive costs of lensing to SHGs are in fact much higher than what state-owned banks seem to think, and could range anywhere between 15% (which is what private banks like ICICI Bank charge when they lend to SHGs) to 28%. In a study of five RRB branches, Sinha (2003) shows that the all inclusive costs of lending to SHGs (taking into account the relatively high transactions costs of dealing with SHGs as well the costs of group formation, which bank are increasing beginning to bear) would translate into interest rates of anywhere between 22% and 28% per year, and in one case, where the RRB was located in a low density, forested district, the costs translated into interest rates as high as 48% per annum. The SHG portfolio is a small part of the total bank lending, portfolio quality is good, and it may be possible to cross subsidize this, but unless banks charge interest rates to recover costs, the model’s financial viability and longer term sustainability may be jeopardized.
V. Meeting the Challenge of Scaling-Up Access to Finance for India’s Rural Poor

5.1 Scaling-Up Various Models of Microfinance: The Role of Government Policy

With significant achievements in recent years, SHG-Bank Linkage needs to be actively supported since, amongst alternatives in the microfinance sector, this is where there appears to be maximum potential for scaling-up, while leveraging on India’s vast network of rural banks. At the same time, in an economy as large and varying as India’s, there is much scope for diversity and new approaches. Government has an important role to play in creating space for innovation and a flexible architecture for new, independent microfinance institutions.. What are the critical issues in scaling-up SHG Bank Linkage and various other models of microfinance in India? This section draws on lessons learned, on what to do and what not do to, based on the experience with SHG Bank Linkage and other microfinance approaches in India, and experience from around the world.

5.1.1 Enabling policy, legal and regulatory framework
An enabling policy, legal and regulatory framework is critical to scaling-up. Such a framework is already in place for SHG Bank Linkage, and scaling-up the model would require Government to simply ensure that the existing framework is maintained. This would require ensuring that the model continues to have a champion with a clear leadership role – a task which NABARD has assumed with exemplary diligence by introducing policies and measures to encourage banks to lend to SHGs. And it would require the authorities to maintain a ‘hands-off’ regulatory policy.

Looking ahead, if the MFI sector is to be scaled-up to complement SHG Bank Linkage, Government could play an important role in establishing an enabling policy, legal and regulatory framework for MFIs. To date, the MFI sector in India has suffered from the absence of an enabling environment. While the success of individual MFIs is largely attributable to their visionary leaders, this is clearly not enough to mainstream the cause of MFIs. Policy coordination for MFIs remains weak; a large number of government ministries/department/agencies are responsible for MFIs, and coordination between them is poor. Moreover, the current legal and regulatory framework for MFIs is d

Microfinance 9.3 of 10 on the basis of 4086 Review.